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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The following study is an examination of the effects of 
globalization, regime type and macroeconomic policy on economic 
growth. 90 countries are examined between the years 1975-2003. While 
there are issues with the use of the proxy variable, the general effects can 
be explored. These effects are found to differ between high-income and 
low-income countries. The analysis finds that low-income countries 
should focus on improving inefficient distribution of services. High-
income countries are able to choose from a range macroeconomic policies 
and are not forced to converge around any one policy.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Globalization is an emerging force that is changing the way that people engage 
one another in a variety of ways. Socially, culturally, security-wise, politically and 
economically people are interacting to a degree to which they never have before. The 
amount of interconnectedness and the scope of the amount of people involved are 
unprecedented. At the same time, globalization has changed the way that the state can 
and is expected to act. Capital mobility has limited the economic policy options available 
to states. Owing to this, there is a question about what varieties of macroeconomic 
policies generate economic growth in this new climate. This study will attempt to address 
what conditions are needed for economic growth and development. 
Evidence suggests that global integration, or globalism, is closely associated with 
trade.1 Globalism is the level of economic exchange and contact between different 
peoples spanning territorial spaces. In this analysis, globalization is defined as an increase 
in the scope of globalism. Liberal policies have played a fundamental theoretical role in 
the process to reduce trade costs and increase global interaction. In this way, liberalism is 
a policy that promotes globalization. As such, many authors link them interchangeably, 
raising their sights beyond any descriptive role for the concept of globalization 
(Rosenburg 2003).2 Instead, globalization is here used to describe only the level of 
interaction that states (and the entities within them) conduct with the international 
community. This is an important distinction, as liberalism is a process that contributes to 
providing the preconditions to globalization, but is not the same thing. A state may 
                                                 
1 Keohane and Nye (2000) distinguish that the density of networks, institutional velocity and transnational 
participation have increased “not in degree but in kind.” As trade networks multiply and deepen, so too do 
social and cultural bonds.  
2 See Dollar and Kraay (2002) or Milner and Kubota (2005) for examples of globalization being used to 
describe an increase in trade. 
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employ openness in some segments of the economy, but restrict it in others, while still 
enjoying a high level of trade in those segments. This does not mean that the 
aforementioned state is necessarily liberal regarding their economy as a whole.3 In this 
study, trade is just one component of globalization, along with social and political 
interactions. 
This definitional of globalization also runs slightly counter to the more traditional 
one given by most liberal scholars. Yale Ferguson and Richard Mansbach state that 
globalization is the “triumph of the market form at a global level (2003; 324).” What 
distinguishes globalization from previous periods of high levels of globalism, such as the 
early 20th century, is the number of people that are involved due to the reduced 
transactions costs of interconnectedness. This is a subtle, albeit key, difference from the 
traditional liberal definition. Globalization is not just increased levels of trade between 
the wealthy segments of the population in select countries; rather globalization allows 
expanding levels of people from differing economic classes and various countries to have 
access (though with differing levels of equality) to the global market and social and 
political global interaction. James Rosenau describes this process as the rise of the 
“global middle class,” as wide segments of society are for the first time able to interact 
globally, rather than just political elites and a small class of merchants that had 
traditionally (2003; 348-368). In this way, economic globalism, while important, is not 
the only component of globalization; cultural is as well. 
                                                 
3 An historic example of this are the so called ‘Asian Tigers’ states of Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong and 
South Korea. While these states were heavily engaged in international trade, their economies were far from 
liberal, in that significant restrictions existed on capital flows and foreign products and investment. A 
contemporary example of this can be seen in China.  
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States that employ liberal policies also have differing domestic policies; therefore, 
there are varying types of policies that incorporate liberal trade principles. While many 
states have implemented liberal trade policies, they have differed regarding the role and 
degree of government intervention within the economy. Some states utilize extensive 
welfare systems while others pursue more minimalist policies to limit government costs 
for theoretical or pragmatic reasons.  
This paper will attempt to analyze what impact on economic growth the 
differences in macroeconomic policies have under varying conditions of globalization. In 
general, what set of policies lead to increases in growth? Does any set of policies actually 
generate growth? These are questions that may be considered given the changing nature 
of macroeconomic policy prescription by international institutions and the response to 
them. Following the stagnation of the Swedish economy, neoliberal policies were widely 
pronounced as the clear successor to the welfare state, as “there [was] no alternative 
(Munck 2005; 60).” However, reaction to the policies imposed by the IMF in response to 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 led to a search for alternatives to quell rising 
‘discontent’ (Stiglitz 2003). 
The paper is outlined as follows. First, an examination of the previous literature 
will provide a background for the thesis presented here. Next, the theory and the 
hypotheses that arise from it are discussed. Following this, the dependent, independent 
and control variables, as well as how they were operationalized, are listed and justified. A 
discussion regarding the methodology used and the limitations that arise from it are 
subsequently given. After this, a rigorous examination of empirical data will be presented 
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and assessed. Finally, the implications of this research and new questions that arise will 
be provided. 
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CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The layout of this section is as follows: first, the impact that globalization plays in 
terms of generating economic growth, how it impacts the role of the state and how and if 
it impacts economic policies will be examined. Second, the debate both for and against 
democracy in promoting economic growth will be explored. Third, the literature 
regarding neoliberal policies will be presented. Finally, previous arguments for neoliberal 
and institutionalist approaches will be made.  
 
2.1 Globalization 
The role that globalization has played in generating economic growth is often 
disputed. While many argue that trade resulting from increased interactions promotes 
benefits for all (or most) (Dollar and Kraay 2002; Friedman 2005), others are more 
concerned with the relative gains and losses (Gilpin 1981; Waltz 2001) or claim that 
globalization has led to benefits for certain classes while the majority has not benefited 
and may actually been hurt (Duménil and Lévy 2005, Clark 2005, Shaikh 2005). 
Additionally, globalization may be fundamentally changing the role of the state 
(Ferguson and Mansbach 2003; Nye and Keohane 1971; Radice 2005; Rosenau 1990; 
Wendt 1999), though this is disputed (Gilpin 1981; Rosenberg 1994; Waltz 1979). 
Finally, there is debate related to the convergence of economic polices under 
globalization, with some arguing that regulatory bodies must act uniformly (Friedman 
1999), while others posit that there is room for differing domestic preferences within the 
globalization’s larger logic (Chang 2003a and 2003b; Stiglitz 2003; Wolf 2005).    
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Open trade policies are advocated by liberals to promote growth. According to 
Adam Smith, often described as the forerunner of capitalism, without interference, 
economic advantages would soon attract attention and people would join in competition 
with the original advantaged firm or individual. This “would be the case in a society were 
things were left to follow their natural course, where their was perfect liberty, and where 
every man was perfectly free both to choose what occupation he thought proper, and to 
change it as often as he thought proper (Smith 2003; 138).” 
The chief source that Smith and David Ricardo, another early influential 
capitalist, cite for increases in production is the division of labor. This is in part caused by 
advances in technology. Instead of paying initial costs and time wasted learning new 
crafts or moving to new equipment, labor can be employed working in one particular 
field, or in factories, on one task. This leads to dramatic increases in production. 
Benefiting from the increase in production are consumers, who are the chief 
winners in free trade. As the supply increases while the demand remains stagnant, prices 
will drop. However, since man is inherently selfish4, with prices lower they will tend to 
want more of the product. When increases in demand occur, more suppliers will attempt 
to gain entry into the market. Therefore, “the natural tendency of profits is to fall . . . This 
tendency, this gravitation as it were of profits, is happily checked at repeated intervals by 
the improvements in machinery connected with the production of necessaries (Ricardo 
2004; 70-71).” This also keeps states from reaching perfect opulence which would result 
in stagnation and decline, as growth is necessary to keep wages and capital increasing 
(Smith 2003; 132). At the same time, this demonstrates the liberals’ optimism that the 
                                                 
4  Smith (2003; 115-117) asserts that when labor’s wages are increased, their productivity increases. This is 
due to the view that a greater gain will cause them to work more, in search of an even greater gain. Ricardo 
(2004; 48), agrees, saying that seeking the opportunity for higher returns is man’s natural, selfish state.    
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future will continue to improve and the necessary rate of technological progress is 
accepted as a given. 
To further heighten a state’s economic capabilities and production, Ricardo 
advances the idea of a comparable advantage. Rather than looking at absolute advantages, 
states should focus on production at what they are best at compared to others. “Under a 
system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital and labor to 
such employments that are beneficial to each. This pursuit of individual advantage is 
admirably connected with the universal good of the whole (Ricardo 2004; 81).” These 
policies are the building blocks of contemporary liberalism and the foundation for 
globalization. 
According to some liberals, there are three main stages to recent world history: 
history prior to 1820, the rise of globalization from 1820 until the mid twentieth century 
and the more recent trend from the mid twentieth century until the present. These three 
different periods can be marked by increasing economic integration and marked until the 
more recent trend by increasing inequality. The recent move to more open markets by 
many countries has contributed to this process, as trade is easier to conduct with lower 
transaction costs (Dollar and Kraay 2002; 447-454). 
 The level of production in the recent period of globalization has been substantially 
greater than it was in the nineteenth century. David Dollar & Aart Kraay conclude that 
“human productivity has increased almost unimaginably” since the 1820’s and 
developing countries have grown faster than developed countries since 1980. Dollar and 
Kraay state that “the current wave of globalization…has actually promoted economic 
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equality and reduced poverty (2002; 448).” They attribute this to market-oriented 
economies, particularly in the world’s two largest countries, China and India. 
 This increase in productivity, illustrated by Dollar & Kraay’s proclamation that in 
“two to three years…the world economy produce[s] the same amount of goods and 
services that it did during the entire nineteenth century (447),” is strongly correlated to 
trade. The increase in trade allows specialization and increased profits while increasing 
efficiency and lowering costs for consumers. 
 At the same time, communication technology has increased, allowing companies 
and individuals to communicate almost instantly from nearly anywhere in the world. This 
reduction in the time-space compression is quite evident in the contemporary world. 
While a person awaiting information in Paris from Tokyo in the past would have been 
forced to wait for weeks or even months for communication by either land or sea, the 
same information can now be sent via the electromagnetic field almost instantaneously. 
This increased connectedness is described as a process of globalization and allows 
transaction costs to be further reduced. 
 Thomas Friedman (2005) argues that such reduction of distance creates a level 
playing field, as the rules of the game are the same for all participants, while others 
disagree.5 A time-space compression allows some sectors of the economy to transform 
quite quickly, most notably the financial sectors. This can make them susceptible to 
speculation and potentially weaken the state. At the same time, too great of levels of 
interdependence may increase the opportunities for conflict or may even, as Hans 
Morgenthau contends, result in economic imperialism (1960; 59). Similarly, increased 
                                                 
5 See David Harvey (2005) or Chang (2003a), for differing accounts of what the ‘rules of the game’ are and 
how they were established, the former’s view that of a radical and latter a historical-institutional account. 
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interdependence may cause states to be reliant on others for amassing goods that are 
necessary for security. For these reasons, realists are likely to oppose moves that allow 
states’ economies to be too closely tied to ‘foreign interests.’ 
 Kenneth Waltz, perhaps the most influential neo-realist, offers a very different 
account of how economies work than Friedman. Far from creating an equal playing field, 
states that are already well positioned within the global economy are likely to attempt to 
continue, if not expand, their benefits. This is due to the maximizing nature, similar to 
firms, of states. While Waltz (2001) argues that it is clear within domestic economies that 
laws are used to prevent monopolies that would otherwise produce net negative 
outcomes, “it is less frequently understood that to expect each country to formulate an 
economic policy that happens to work  to the full advantage of all countries is utopian 
(196).”  
Liberals may point to institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
as an effort to overcome this problem; however, while the WTO has had success forcing 
smaller states to adopt more open policies, it has had some difficulty in getting its 
wealthy member to surrender their subsides in agriculture, as has been noted in the Doha 
Round.6 Realists may contend that specific sectors are important to building a state’s 
latent power,7 which are also then protected by the powerful states from liberal trade 
laws, and that under “a condition of anarchy . . . relative gain is more important than 
absolute gain (Waltz 2001; 198)!”  
                                                 
6 This can also be seen among powers, as the United States has demanded the European Union remove the 
Cooperative Agricultural Policy (CAP), as well as allow genetically modified produce and livestock, while 
the EU cites health concerns. In addition, both the US and the EU have refused to remove subsidies despite 
the cries of the Third World, demanding that it will not budge until the other does, as well as citing the need 
to protect family farms. 
7 Latent power is described by one realist scholar as the “socio-economic ingredients that go into building 
military power (Mearsheimer 2001; 55) 
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Robert Gilpin adds that “economic interdependence and the promise of mutual 
gains have not eliminated the efforts of nations to advance their own interests at the 
expense of others and at the expense of the overall economic efficiency of the global 
economy (1981; 220).” He argues that “nations have become more apprehensive over the 
loss of autonomy” and that “[e]comomic nationalism has never been far below the 
surface (Gilpin 1981; 220).”  
 Radical, or Marxist, scholars also dispute liberals’ assertion of open trade leading 
to growth and agree with realists that relative gains are of significant importance. Like 
realists, they argue that the “international trade regime [the WTO and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade before it] is the main mechanism through which the 
global market is regulated and disputes are resolved through a formalized system” and 
that “this set of international rules is negotiated by the powerful states of the world that 
dominate the multilateral economic organizations; they are not generated spontaneously 
as neoliberals would pretend (Munck 2005; 62).” Unlike realists, however, they examine 
the role of class and principle-agent problems in addressing globalization, claiming 
policies to promote enhanced globalization actually reduce real growth.  
Radicals argue that globalization “is fundamentally a new world order in which 
the power and income of the upper fractions of the ruling classes—the wealthiest 
persons—was re-established in the wake of a setback (Duménil and Lévy 2005; 9).8 
Despite a decline in growth rates since its implementation following the Keynesian 
financial crisis, radicals contend that wealth concentration of the economic elites9 rose to 
levels not seen since the Second World War. A common criticism levied by radicals 
                                                 
8 Emphasis in original. 
9 Economic elites in wealthy states were not the only beneficiaries; elites that served the foreign interests at 
the expense of their state’s citizens and environment were rewarded and advocated such policies as well. 
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against liberals is the claim that such an action was morally justifiable, as it rewarded the 
hard working and skilled and punished the lethargic due to the mechanisms of greater 
competition. This justification was quickly embraced by the economic elites within states 
that utilized liberal policies and by the working classes that aligned their own interests 
with them.  
 According to this account, liberal policies have not led to the promised increased 
economic growth; instead, it has led to a decline in growth. This is partially due to the 
revamping of the economy under neoliberal policies. Rather than seeking growth and 
increased employment, financial institutions are increasingly attractive to business 
leaders, leading to patterns of capital accumulation as dividends replaced profit rates, 
reducing actual growth (Duménil and Lévy 2005; 13). Furthermore, states that had 
opened to neoliberal policies experienced the negatives of foreign capital, in that it aimed 
at liquid assets that can quickly be pulled out at signs of potential turbulence (Duménil 
and Lévy 2005; 16-18).  
 To justify the transition of income to the elites, the market is frequently described 
as the best resource to fulfill society’ needs by free choice. Simon Clarke (2005) objects 
to this, countering that neoliberal doctrine as “an instrument of ‘natural selection’ that 
judges not on the basis of the individual’s ability to contribute to society, but on the basis 
of the individual’s ability to contribute to the production of surplus value and the 
accumulation of capital (55).” Free choice is manipulated and free information is not 
allowed to flow allowing the wealthiest, as the only ones that can afford to participate in 
the mass media, to dictate choice, restrict information and create ‘need’.  
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 In addition, far from promoting growth, neoliberal policies allow the advanced, 
wealthy states and elites within them to grow while the poor and weaker states are forced 
to either further exploit their destitute labor or be forced to join that labor market 
themselves, as they cannot keep pace with the increases in marginal profit generated from 
expensive technological investments. Rather than reduce trade imbalances, these policies 
enhance it. This contemporary line of thought is similar to the world systems theory 
developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974).  
In addition, radicals point out that the concept of comparable advantage is in 
contrast to all other principles of trade within a single competitive market, as would be 
the case under a global, open market. In Ricardo’s model, it is assumed that exchange 
rates are fixed. However, under conditions of global financial markets, surplus traders 
would have access to capital markets that enhance their ability to purchase technology 
and keep real costs low compared to those that do not have a comparable, or only a 
minimal, profit margin (Shaikh 2005; 47). This leads to a continued imbalance in trade.  
How globalization has impacted and changed the state is also heavily debated. 
Many scholars argue that international relations are undergoing a dramatic shift. Politics 
between states is no longer the most common nor interesting interaction of political 
entities (Rosenau 1976). Instead, politics is now global within states and between 
subunits within different states. States are losing authority; not only upwards to regional 
and global bodies, but also downwards to local ones (Rosenau 2003). 
Territorial distance has also lost some of its impact in the modern world. Ferguson 
and Mansbach declare that a “moral community presumes a normative consensus among 
individuals at least on some key issues which is expressed explicitly or implicitly as a 
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politically relevant identity (2004; 130).”10 Martin Wolf notes that a “sense of belonging 
is a part of people’s sense of security (2005; 276).” Such a community is not based on 
territory; instead, individuals are linked by agreed upon values, be that religious, 
financial, political ideology or otherwise. Rosenau (2003) describes this situation as one 
of “distant proximities,” as individuals may be part of a moral community that is made up 
of a relatively few number of members that span the length of the globe, yet may have 
little in common with others that are within a close physical proximity.  
 Related to this concept is psychological distance. Ferguson and Mansbach define 
this as “the degree of dissimilarity between cognitive frameworks or ways of looking at, 
assigning meaning to, and coping with the world regardless of geographical distance 
(2004; 69).” Wendt (1999) argues that many states are beginning the transition out of the 
‘Lockean age’ and into the ‘Kantian age.’ This transition is a change in the logic of 
anarchy11, as states decreasingly see anarchy as based on conflict and instead see one 
another on more friendly and common terms, as the psychological distance between them 
has been reduced. Conflicts may still arise, but war is not imaginable and cooperation is 
preferred and sought.12   
 Similar to the concept of a moral community is that of an epistemic community. 
Peter Hass defines an epistemic community as “a network of professionals with 
recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area (1992; 3).” This type of 
community encompasses business and occupational groupings. These groups share an 
                                                 
10 Emphasis in original. 
11 See Wendt (1992) for how anarchy is a social construct. 
12 Wendt (1999) points to relations within the European Union, as well as NATO members to demonstrate a 
change in how sovereignty is characterized and how norms shift over time. 
  
  
14
expertise in a specific interest area and identify themselves as such. Antonio Gramsci also 
expressed such a sentiment, saying that as tasks become more complex, “that each 
practical activity tends to create a new school for its own executives and specialists and 
hence to create a body of specialist intellectuals (1971; 26-33).” In turn, these groups are 
looked at by society at large when situations that are related to their field arise. 
 Inherent in these groups, as well as in any actor that participates in global politics, 
are values. Values are what unite individuals in these groups. Ferguson and Mansbach 
define values as “abstract aspirations for improving the human condition that may be 
pursued only indirectly through the acquisition of scarce objects that serve as stakes in 
political contests (2004; 23).” Such a context is how groups identify themselves and their 
interests. Individuals’ hierarchies of identities change depending on the issue. In this way, 
an individual may be in several moral communities at the same time.13 These groups are 
also not restricted to distance, as the basic unit—the moral community—may exist 
regardless of territorial space. 
 This hierarchy of identities applies not only to the individual, but to various moral 
communities. Far from being the highest loyalty of its citizens, the state may actually be 
in competition with a number of other polities depending on the issue. It is important to 
clarify what is meant by polity. According to Ferguson and Mansbach, “a polity (or 
political authority) has a distinct identity; a capacity to mobilize persons and their 
resources for political purposes, that is, for value satisfaction: and a degree of 
institutionalization and hierarchy (leaders and constituents) (1996; 34).” This goes 
                                                 
13 An example of this may be an individual that is a teacher, a member of teacher’s union, a member of the 
Sierra Club, a member of the NRA, of a member of a local softball team, a local volunteer fireperson and a 
citizen of the United States. Depending on the issue, this individual may identify with whichever group is 
applicable and change that identify if another issue emerges.  
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beyond the state; as many organizations can be classified as a polity under this criterion. 
These can range from the state, to the family, to the local city among others.  
 History, real or imagined, is also important to this globalization as it impacts 
culture. Without examining culture—which are “socially collective ways of viewing the 
world” (Ferguson and Mansbach 2004; 153)—the actions of polities cannot be 
understood. As individuals identify with polities other than the state, the states’ role 
decreases. While neoliberals and cosmopolitans suggests that international institutions 
and regimes are absorbing much of this authority (Keohane 1986, Hasenclever et al 1997, 
Held and McGrew 2003), Rosenau challenges this, saying that “globalization is but one 
component of the transformative dynamics that underlie the emergence of a new epoch” 
and that “localization is also a powerful force at work throughout the world (Rosenau 
2003).” In this way, the state is challenged from both the top and bottom. 
 This view of the state as declining in its role is not universal. Wolf argues that 
since states implement policies to open their markets, they are still the dominant actor in 
global politics (2005; 251). Others argue that the state is vital in the creation and 
implementation of capitalism. Karl Marx argued that the state, through ‘primitive 
accumulation,’ laid the foundation for capitalism by creating the necessary conditions for 
it through political, non-market, means.14  
One role that the state still has an impact on is areas where distance still matters. 
Because individuals exist in physical space, territory will always matter to some degree 
(Wolf 2005; 16). Physical protection of property rights requires some form a physical 
enforcement. In this way, the state, which is the provider of physical security in most of 
                                                 
14 For a further explanation of primitive accumulation, see Marx (1976; 872-940). For a brief overview of 
this, see Bynes (2005). 
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the world, still has role. However, the state is now more expected to provide basic 
services that help the functioning of the market, such as infrastructure, education and 
other public goods. 
  Realists, such as Waltz, argue that those that focus on the effects of non-state 
actors are missing the point. Waltz states that “the units of greatest capability set the 
scene of action for others as well as for themselves (1979; 61).” States are still the 
dominant actors because “when the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other 
actors operate (Waltz 1979; 89).” Gilpin asserts that contrary to modern science and 
technology contributing to shared norms and values, “modern science and technology 
may intensify the conflict over the globe’s resources.” He continues that “nationalism, 
with its roots in seventeenth century Europe, has become the predominant religion of 
modern man (Gilpin 1981; 225).” 
Finally, there remains debate whether globalization forces a convergence around 
specific macroeconomic policies. The argument for convergence is based on the idea that 
no alternative policy is reasonable than to fully embrace the market. Friedman (2005) 
describes this as the ‘golden straightjacket’ because states have no choice put to enact 
specific policies, but they will be rewarded for doing so. State’s hands are forced due to 
technological innovations that render it unable to control the spread of ideas or finances.  
Likewise, neoliberals demand that states establish parameters and then remove 
themselves from economics in order to allow the market to allocate resources. Ha-Joon 
Chang notes that “over the last decade or so, [the] push for a minimal, pro-business state 
has been further intensified with the rise of the globalization discourse that sees the 
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nation-state at best as an anachronism and at worst as an obstacle to human progress 
(2003b; 1).” 
   However, Karl Polanyi (1944) counters this assessment, arguing that as the 
market is institutionalized within the social and political framework of a society, social 
pathologies fearing enhanced economic insecurity result. This dialectic is due to the 
inherent contradiction within institutionalizing something that by its very logic is anti-
institutional. Owing to this contradiction, minimal state regulations devolve into no state 
regulation, as enforcement of regulations are increasingly viewed as state intrusion.  
Wolf argues that globalization and democracy can co-exist, as there continues to 
be a variety of policies15 that can be enacted under its conditions, that there is no 
convergence around one form of capitalism. To do this, he examines several 
institutionalist European models. These countries embrace globalization while at the 
same time utilizing a large and functioning welfare state. Far from suffering from a flight 
of capital, Wolf finds that these states actually attract capital. He accounts this to the idea 
that “a generous social security system increases people’s sense of security and so may 
make them more willing to embrace change (2005; 257).” Wolf also argues that values 
that are reinforced by democratic means, such as education and specific behaviors, are 
attractive to corporations and capital. Wolf states that this enables states continued 
benefits, because “as development proceeds, a region will build the foundations for its 
next successes . . . The high-income countries of today are the beneficiaries of such a 
positive feedback process over up to two centuries (2005; 264).”16  
                                                 
15 For examples of the various ‘varieties of capitalism,’ see Hall and Soskice (2001) 
16 This supporting statement seems to counteract Wolf’s previous argument that the global south is not 
victim to a perpetual vicious cycle while the global north’s benefits allow it to continually build on their 
historic advantage, but I digress.  
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These types of policies are what Munck (2005) refers to as the ‘high road,’ as 
opposed to the ‘low road,’ of capitalism. High road capitalism focuses on service and 
technological industries, where human capital is vital, whereas low road tend to be labor 
intensive industries. Differing state goals lead to differing macroeconomic policies 
depending on which road a state attempts to travel.    
 
2.2 Democracy 
The rise of democracy and its consolidation also has many appeals. The most 
recent wave of democratization, the so-called ‘Third Wave’, has occurred on a scale 
surpassing both previous waves and has been one of the major changes in human history 
(Huntington 1991).  Democratic norms and values have gained prominence all over the 
world and are currently more widespread than at any other time in history. Some even 
argue that liberal democracy is the final form of political institution and that, following 
the end of the Cold War, there are no ideologies that can challenge democracy’s appeal 
(Fukuyama 1993). In 2000, Freedom House claimed that 63% of the world, 120 countries 
total, were democratic (Diamond and Plattner 2001). Of that, 37% of the world is 
classified as liberal democracies (Diamond 2000).  This is in stark contrast to just one 
century prior, when no countries met the current standards of democracy. 
Even as we may now be seeing a retraction of democratic growth (Diamond 
2008), it is reasonable to speculate about its relationship with the global economy.  
Interestingly, the world itself adds more curiosity to the study of the relationship. The 
majority of wealthy countries are free, liberal democracies. Of the twenty countries with 
GDP per capita of $30,000 or more in 2005, only Qatar is listed as not free by Freedom 
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House.  On the other hand, only one, Sao Tome and Principe, of the thirty-three poorest 
countries meets the Freedom House’s standard to be free.17 
Whether democratic systems are better at establishing economic development 
than other regime types is an interesting topic which has been studied by numerous 
scholars with mixed results, as some research shows a clear positive relationship between 
them (Jakobsen and de Soysa 2006; Jensen 2003; Milner and Kubota 2005), whereas 
others do not (Li and Resnick 2003; Oneal 1994) and some are quite mixed (Cho and 
Nieman 2008; Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu 2008).  
Examining this empirical evidence, MacEwan (2005) notes, “when the political 
process in a country is not democratic and political regulation of the market is used to 
create and protect the wealth and privileges of an elite, then deregulation – neoliberalism 
– can be readily associated with democracy (174).” The old axiom that a free market can 
exist without democracy, but democracy cannot exist without a free market appears to be, 
on the surface, true. MacEwan continues that “historically . . . democracy (however 
limited) and the market advanced together against the regulation of societies dominated 
by monarchs and nobility (174).” 
 
 
2.3 Macroeconomic Policy 
2.3.1 Neoliberalism 
Neoliberalism values the efficiency of the market above all else as the “market 
symbolizes rationality in terms of an efficient distribution of resources (Munck 2005; 61). 
                                                 
17 IMF World Outlook Economic Database. 
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This is in part due to its measure of efficiency in purely monetary terms as opposed to 
welfare or equal opportunity. Neoliberal theorists, such as Robert Nozick (1974) and 
Friedrich Hayek (1944; 1976), suggest that efficiency measured in any other way 
undermines liberty. By equating efficiency in the market to freedom, any obstacle to the 
production of the largest possible aggregate of monetary gains is viewed as an attack on 
the individual’s freedom. Anything that is unproductive—that is, there is no direct or 
relatively immediate increase in capital from the enterprise, which includes medical and 
most social programs—is undesirable; if money is taken from everyone to this type of 
enterprise that may benefit others it violates the individuals’ ability to achieve their own 
ends to help another group achieve theirs. This has a profound impact in what regard 
neoliberal theory permit the state to behave. The results are a minimalist state that 
protects property rights, strongly enforces the predetermined rule of law and does little 
else. As the state is removed from the market, and the impediments that are created by it, 
global integration through trade increases. 
Adhering to liberal markets becomes the epitome of freedom; anything done to 
restrict their activity is to be considered to limit freedom. Neoliberalism regards 
“economic freedom [as] essential to the existence of all other forms of freedom, including 
religious, political and intellectual freedom (Overtveldt 2007; 63).” The market reflects 
what people want better than the government, as people know their own individual wants 
while the government does not. As a result, there exists a strong “belief in the power of 
markets and the related case for limited government (Overtveldt 2007; 198).” Neoliberal 
policies are operationalized as policies which attempt to remove any impediment or 
legislation that in any way restricts the actions of the market.  
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 This faith in the market allows the individual to pursue their own individual aims. 
Any attempt to administer community goals may violate goals of some individuals. In 
order to prevent totalitarianism or to violate the freedom of any person, “the individual 
must mostly aim not at some ultimate ends but at procuring means which they think will 
help them to satisfy those ultimate ends (Hayek 1976; 8-9).” The way to do this is with 
money, which allows the individual to purchase those means. The aggregate desire and 
willingness to achieve these ends produces the market. 
 In order to prevent the government from becoming totalitarian in dictating to the 
individual what the individual’s aims should be, governments must be hamstrung in some 
way. Milton Friedman, an influential neoliberal economist, wanted to restrict 
governments’ ability to arbitrarily change monetary policy. Friedman argued that “the 
precise rate of growth, like the precise monetary total, is less important than the adoption 
of some stated and known rate (Overtveldt 2007; 167).” This restricts the ability of 
governments to change policy during depressions or other crises. This faith in the markets 
to be self correcting is fundamentally at odds with liberal interventionist policies to 
correct market failures advocated by John Maynard Keynes and Gunnar Myrdal.18 
Instead, governments must adhere to predetermined ‘rules of the game,’ which Friedman 
predicts will result in economies that are apolitical and free of bias. 
Rather than create policy, the government should instead restrict itself to 
rigorously protect property rights to ensure that the market works well and ensure their 
citizen’s physical security. Fritz Scharf adds that “if the state intervenes in the economy, 
it is likely to interfere with, and potentially to disable, the intelligence of decentralized 
information processing and, ultimately, to paralyze the dynamism of the capitalist 
                                                 
18 The policies suggested by Keynes and Myrdal will be explored in the following section. 
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economy (1999; 371).” The potential for government intervention to limit or even 
prohibit growth runs “contrary to the view of those who believe that legislators and 
officials are responsible for rising standards of living,” whereas George Schultz and 
Kenneth W. Dam argue that “the market system itself has been our most resilient and 
versatile economic tool—a superior problem-solver, both in satisfying private wants and 
in achieving public goals. Yet too often . . . market solutions have too often been set aside 
at precisely the time when needed most.”19 All of these scholars maintain that the 
“invisible hand” approach noted by Adam Smith provides the greatest economic growth 
and that state action, however well intended, restricts the market and leads to suboptimal 
outcomes. Thus, neoliberal policies favor markets and restrict and reduce the financial 
and economic role of the state. 
Most social programs are held in low esteem by neoliberal theorists. While the 
idea of many social programs may be commendable, the implementation by the 
government requires that they take resources from someone else to pay to help another 
group. For Hayek, no matter the plight of the poor or downtrodden, nor any sympathies 
one may hold for them, they do not constitute any moral obligation on the part of society 
to help them. Hayek continues that “outside the sphere of individual responsibility there 
is neither goodness nor badness, neither opportunity for moral merit nor the chance of 
proving one’s desires to what one thinks right.” He concludes that “only where we 
ourselves are responsible for our own interests and are free to sacrifice them, has our 
moral value (Hayek 1944; 216).” In fact, Margaret Thatcher, one of the first practitioners 
of neoliberal policies on a wide scale, said that there was “no such thing as a society, only 
                                                 
19 Schultz and Dam (1977) cited in Overtveldt,  The Chicago School, 329 
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individual men and women.”20 Neoliberalism’s goal is, to turn homo sapiens away from 
being social creatures and into homo economus: a purely economic creature and that 
policies that respect and promote actions of the individual for their own gain that will, in 
the end, benefit society as a whole. 
 
2.3.2 Institutionalism 
Critics have argued that neoliberal policies miss many important aspects of the 
role of governments. One critic, David Harvey, makes the claim that neoliberalism is 
fundamentally anti-democratic, as democracies tend to support some interventionist 
policies and that they reduce the absolute rights of the individual.21 Such interventionist 
policies interfere with and obstruct the market. This point is supported by Dani Rodrik’s 
assertion that “since trade policy almost always has redistributive consequences…one 
should not expect broad popular support for trade when trade involves exchanges that 
clash with (and erode) prevailing domestic social arrangements (1997; 380).” 
Institutionalists view the market as only one tool to be used among many in order to 
promote and maintain economic growth while at the same time protecting the 
individual’s liberty. 
 In order to protect one, if not the most, important goals of liberalism—
democracy—some have advocated institutional, or embedded, liberalism as an alternative 
to neoliberalism. Ferguson and Mansbach state that “[p]eople are losing their ability to 
control their own lives or to choose how to live them.” They refer to this as “a growing 
democratic deficit (2004; 324).” One way in which the individual is impaired is noted by 
                                                 
20 Margaret Thatcher, October 1987, Women’s Own as cited in Simon Clarke (2005) 
21 See Harvey (2005) Ch 3, 64-86 for how practiced neoliberalism supports intervention in ways that 
undermine democracy.  
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Dam. The ability of firms to lobby agents in democracies with votes or resources gives 
them an unequal fair of the political influence that is at odds with the liberal principle of 
individual liberty.22 Arthur MacEwan argues that “[p]rivatizations raise issues of 
democracy especially sharply when they involve enterprises where public and private 
interests are likely to dictate very different sorts of decisions (2005; 172).” Markets limit 
democracy in this setting because contrary to the “fundamental principle of democracy – 
one person, one vote” in a society dominated by the market “is ruled by one dollar, one 
vote” which “effectively limits democracy and supports the continuance of capitalist 
authority (MacEwan 2005; 171).”23 John Rawls documented this tendency and attempted 
to counter it when he developed his liberal principle of fair equality of opportunity (1973; 
83). 
 Arising from the democratic deficit is what Strange calls “Pinocchio’s problem 
(1996; 199).” Once the state’s surrender their authority act in the market, there is nothing 
to balance the results of the market. When collective action problems arise, there is little 
that can be done. Evidence of this is that states can no longer protect their domestic 
economies or money markets from outside forces, in particular speculative attacks by 
private firms that can become self-fulfilling prophecies.   
To combat this, liberal welfare economic models are designed to allow the state to 
intervene when the actions of individuals do not add up to optimal outcomes, thus 
producing market failures. The most widely institutionalized theory prior to neoliberalism 
                                                 
22 Dam (2001; 291-292) as cited in Overtveldt (2007; 330). Dam says that some of the polices he advocated 
would not have succeeded without the pressure of interest groups. This is reminiscent of a statement by 
Mill that states, “the ‘people’ who exercise power are not always the same people with those over whom it 
is exercised, and the ‘self-government’ spoken of is not the government of each by himself, but of each by 
the rest (2005; 6).” However, institutional models may restrict this and, as Rawls (1973) advocates, ensure 
the principle of political equality where the market itself cannot. 
23 Italics in original. 
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is the Keynesian model, which was prevalent following World War II. Another 
prominent theory is institutionalism, which is coordinated market economy strategy, 
which unites organized labor and business together under supervision of the state to 
formulate policy. This is associated with Gunnar Myrdal and the policies he established 
in Sweden while another noted scholar, Ha-Joon Chang (2003a), suggests that the 
institutional model is best developmental policy and claims that every developed state 
employed its practices to reach their level of development. 
All of the alternate liberal economic strands are loosely based off of the work of 
the classic liberal John Stuart Mill, particularly in his later years. According to Mill, some 
income redistribution is acceptable in order to increase utility. In addition, Mill validated 
worker unions, despite their increase in the cost of goods to the consumer, along the same 
grounds. 
 Mill argues that after a certain point, the wealthy should not gain goods in excess 
and that the amount of people possessing such goods should increase. It does not a matter 
to Mill if the laboring classes have resources to compete within the market with the upper 
classes or not, they should receive the goods. In this way, the total utility is increased, as 
more gain the initial utility of the good, rather than the diminishing returns of utility of 
that the upper classes receive from hoarding a good. Mill says this should occur 
regardless of whether there is an increase in the production of the good or not. “Whether 
the aggregate produce increases absolutely or not, is a thing in which, after a certain 
amount has been obtained, neither the legislator nor the philanthropist need feel any 
strong interest: but, that it should increase relatively to the number of those who share in 
it, is of the utmost importance (Mill 1921; 752).” 
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 Regarding trade unions, while accepting that unions increase the costs of goods to 
consumers, Mill counters that the “cheapness of goods is desirable only when the cause 
of it is that their production costs little labor, and not when occasioned by that labor’s 
being ill remunerated.” Mill disputes that this puts undo costs on others of the laboring 
classes, saying that “when it is a permanent thing, the principles . . . show that it can have 
no such effect (1921; 935).” This demonstrates that Mill holds faith in the market to 
overcome the collusion of workers and that the minimal utility costs to consumers is 
overcome by the greater increase in utility of the employees. Again, Mill demonstrates 
that the market is simply a tool for achieving the greatest aggregated utility to society, 
which may and often does differ from monetary aggregates. This is due to the 
diminishing returns as more and more of a good or of money is collected.  
  The first of the alternate policies that will be examined is embedded liberalism, 
better known as Keynesian economics. One of its theoretical defenders, John Rawls 
(1973), argues that inequalities must be contained in order to provide basic rights, which 
includes a right to subsistence, in addition to the security right that Hayek (1976) touts in 
Law, Legislation and Liberty. In addition, the government should be an ‘employer of last 
resort,’ providing health insurance and constrain inequalities in order to provide citizens 
equality of opportunity (Rawls 2002). 
In order to do this, states follow Keynesian economic policy, which advocates full 
employment by means of state intervention when the business cycle experiences a 
downturn through alterations to the monetary policy.24 Previously, governments would 
reduce spending and increase taxes when economic depressions occurred, exacerbating 
the problem. Keynes stressed the need of governments to take efforts to increase 
                                                 
24 See Keynes (1997) book IV chapter III for an explanation of trade cycles. 335-344. 
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consumption during depressions rather than focusing on the supply side of economic 
analysis. Keynes argues that employment levels are dependent on the expected income 
that a firm has (1997; 89). On account of this, Keynes developed the propensity to 
consume function, which is that the “aggregate consumption mainly depends on the 
amount of aggregate income (1997; 96).” Therefore, if income is increased, people will 
purchase more goods, which in turn creates heightened expectations of sales, which leads 
to greater employment.  
Conversely, “a diminished propensity to consume has cet. par. a depressing effect 
on employment (Keynes 1997; 211).” Due to this, Keynes criticized the classic liberal 
notion that savings is equal to investment, instead arguing that the liquidity preference—
the preference of the individual to have their capital in money form to purchase goods—
determines how quickly money circulates in the economy. Keynes also favored income 
redistribution because wealthy individuals save more, thus keeping money out of 
circulation (1997; 373). 
This policy does not necessarily depend on the state, as is often stated. It requires 
only that one central authority dictates macroeconomic monetary policy, such as interest 
rates. An example of a non-state entity doing this is the European Central Bank in the 
European Union, or countries that give up their sovereignty and tie their currency to the 
United States, leaving them vulnerable to the decisions of the Federal Reserve with little 
room for recourse or risk uncertainly in their currency. Rawls (2002) actually advocates a 
world tax body and that liberal and “illiberal yet just peoples” can join, even if it lacks 
many of the characteristics of the state. 
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Garrett also points out that we do not see a “pervasive policy race to the neo-
liberal bottom among the OECD countries, nor have governments that have persisted 
with interventionist policies invariably been hamstrung by capital flight (1997; 396).” 
This is because strong states, the ones that were able to relatively enforce policy in the 
past, still do so. In addition, interventionist policies can provide many benefits to a state 
to compete in a globalizing world. In fact, at times, the markets actually value it. 
Intervention often provided stability to a state and its economy, something firms look for. 
In order for states to provide the education and infrastructure that many firms want, 
particularly middle to high end firms, a state must have some taxation. States that can 
provide human capital are more successful in attracting investment (Garrett 1997; 384-
402). This shows that this policy still has relevance in the present world if varying 
polities in a region choose to adhere to the policies of it, even if states continue to 
surrender certain responsibilities 
The next alternative to neoliberal economic policy was credited to Gunnar Myrdal 
and is in many ways similar to what Keynes presented. Myrdal advocated what came to 
be known as the ‘Stockholm School of Economics.’ This line of thought is social 
corporatist and sets policies under the consideration of organized business, organized 
labor and the government. Myrdal notes that price is reflective of anticipated changes in a 
dynastic market, refuting the partial equations that are favored by neoliberals.25 Rather 
than balanced budgets, Myrdal advocates a position of two budgets: one running and one 
of capital investment. 
 Myrdal’s dual budgets are designed to allow the government to intervene in the 
economy to stimulate, much like Keynes, however, he attempts to constrain the 
                                                 
25 From a collection of Myrdal compiled by Appelquist and Andersson (2005). 
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government from continued expansion and debt with required over budgeting and 
medium term balancing. Nevertheless, this does not endear him to neoliberals. Myrdal’s 
model includes significant state intervention in welfare programs and his capital 
investment budget is one of state owned business. He expects state monopolies and 
businesses to turn a profit, but they are the businesses that would receive significant 
resource increases to stimulate the economy in times of depression. Therefore, the state 
would control important sectors of the economy that possess far-reaching implications on 
the economy as a whole. 
 Myrdal also subscribes to a holistic, rather than prescriptive, method of dealing 
with social problems, such as crime and healthcare. Using an eclectic approach, finds that 
it would be cheaper and more efficient in the long run to deal with the root causes of 
expensive social costs, like crime. To do so, other social sciences can provide their 
expertise on what these root causes are. In turn, the government will provide these 
prescribed applications in kind, rather than in actual money, to ensure the cause is dealt 
with. 
 Results of this approach are mostly positive, reflected by the Scandinavian 
countries low crime rates. However, such a model may be more difficult to carry out in 
states with less cultural and ethnic homogeneity, as differences in application may 
become evident. To counter this, Myrdal made these in kind resources available to nearly 
the entire population. Firms could still compete against the government, but more than 
likely it would have to be in higher end versions, as the government would create 
minimum standard goods. Open trade is also likely under such a model, as organized 
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labor covers multiple segments of the population that benefit from the gains that free 
trade and integration to the international economy provides. 
The costs for this are also very high initially. Myrdal advocates accounting the 
large investments over time by amortizing them, saying they will pay for themselves in 
time. Additionally, since many problems are interconnected, the state must make 
minimum standards and make these available to all in areas such as housing, 
infrastructure, education, health care, etc. This is the only way to ensure everyone an 
equal opportunity, thus meeting Rawls’ criteria of justice. Additionally, firms will also 
benefit as they face less transaction costs and the state pays for ‘unproductive’ areas of 
investment, such as health care.26  
The final alternative liberal approach is the institutional approach of Chang. 
Previously, it was argued of the importance of the role of property rights within the 
neoliberal theoretical lineage. However, Chang counters the argument that “without the 
property ownership to appropriate the efficiency gains from better management, 
managers do not have the incentive to improve enterprise efficiency” with the assertion 
that “most large private enterprises are not run by owners either (2003b; 9).” In addition, 
it could be argued that this is why more corporations and other firms have implemented 
profit sharing, which goes strongly against Ricardo’s desire that workers receive no more 
than what is required to feed and cloth the employee’s family .27  
Chang argues that intellectual property values are also overstated in their 
importance. The reason for this is that “there is a ‘natural’ imitation gap, which allows for 
                                                 
26 For more on Myrdal’s vision and the polities he helped implement in Sweden, see The Essential Gunnar 
Myrdal by Orjan Appelquist and Stellan Andersson (2005). 
27 Ricardo declares that “the natural price of labor is that price which is necessary to enable the laborers . . . 
to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either increase or diminution (2004; 52).” 
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the innovators to enjoy monopoly positions (and therefore extra profits) long enough to 
recoup their investments in innovation (Chang 2003b; 13).” This falls in line with 
Schumpeter’s theory of why monopolies are actually a positive, which runs counter to the 
traditional liberal doctrine. Schumpeter claims that innovation is impossible under perfect 
competition due to innovation causing this to be “temporarily suspended whenever 
anything new is being introduced (1994; 105).” 
Under the institutional approach advocated by Chang, the state acts as a visionary 
that provides the foundation and direction in goals that private firms then fulfill. Chang 
argues that “by providing such a vision at the early stage of change, the state can drive 
private sector agents into a concerted action without making them spend resources on 
information gathering and processing, bargaining and so on (2003b; 53).” 
 This is possible because the “capitalist system is made up of a range of 
institutions, including markets as institutions of exchange, firms as institutions of 
production, and the state as the creator and regulator of the institutions governing their 
relationships.” Moreover, “there are some regulations that are essential for the very 
existence, not to speak of the effective functioning, of many markets (Chang 2003b; 90, 
8).” 
 The state can provide insurance to firms by guaranteeing a certain level of 
income, which in turn can “improve the productivity of the economy in the medium to 
long run by encouraging risk taking in general and investments in specific assets.” This 
encourages the market to be dynamic. When the state fails to do this, “people will be 
reluctant to take risks (Chang 2003b; 61).” This type of model can manifest itself in both 
democratic and authoritarian societies, as is demonstrated in by the industrial policy 
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states (such as Singapore and Taiwan) and the social corporatist states (Scandinavian 
states).28 In both cases, there is the “existence of a political and/or bureaucratic elite 
which had a stronger commitment to social goals such as industrialization and structural 
change than is usually regarded as possible by the neoliberals (Chang 2003b; 68).” These 
policies, also demonstrated noted in Robert Kuttner’s (2008) analysis of Denmark in a 
case study of alternative institutionalist models, demonstrate how a welfare state can be 
compatible with, and even encourage growth and investment, in a globalized state. 
Both Keynes’ and Myrdal’s approaches can fit under the guise of Chang’s 
institutionalism. These will provide the counter to the neoliberal approach that will be 
examined in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 For more on how each of these types or institutionalism work, see Chang chapter 2, 45-74. 
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CHAPTER 3. THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Globalization is changing the state’s role in economic development. Johan Van 
Overtveldt wrote that “globalization, which is nothing more than the application of free-
market policies across borders, cultures, and continents, has triumphed worldwide on a 
heretofore unseen scale (2007; 358).” Neoliberalism as a policy can be very attractive to 
certain sectors29 of the business community as it advocates an efficient market that is 
conducive towards removing costs and any obstacles to business in order to produce the 
greatest aggregate amount of money, regardless of distribution.30 “[P]rominent members 
of the business community backed economists who preached the advantages of free 
competition and capitalism” Overtveldt (2007; 267) observed.  
At the same time, globalization has caused a dramatic shift in the employment 
structure. In advanced, industrialized states, “the two traditional and, until recently, 
leading sectors of employment, that is, agriculture and industry, have everywhere 
contracted (Iverson and Cusack 2000; 314).” As this shift occurs, many people find 
themselves ill-equipped, due to lack of skills in new and different industries, to find 
employment.31 
Social uneasiness and calls for insurance to offset the loss of job and retraining 
are sought by populations. The rising tide of globalization, however, is now widely seen 
as a hindrance to a government’s ability to meet these demands and even a cause of 
                                                 
29 In particular, the financial sector has enjoyed liberation attributed to neoliberal policies, as the financial 
profits as a percent of total domestic profits has increased from roughly 15 percent in 1970 to just under 40 
percent in 2005 (Economic Report for the President, 2008). For an account of the benefits, see Wolf (2005) 
Ch 13; for potential drawbacks, see Duménil and Lévy (2005). 
30 At the same time, inefficient sectors and those that control capital in a capital scarce region are likely to 
oppose liberalization policies. 
31 Rosenau refers to these people as “alienated” with globalizing forces. For further discussion on the types 
of alienation within the “private world,” see Rosenau 2003 Ch 6, 153-169. 
  
  
34
government cutbacks. This can result in what Rodrik calls “social disintergration (1997; 
379).”32 Governments that focus on an institutionalist approach are more adapt at 
responding to labor concerns and building the infrastructure to facilitate economic 
growth, rather than relying solely on the market. 
The chapters discussing globalization, neoliberalism and institutionalism provide 
an important backdrop to this study. At their core, both neoliberalism and institutionalism 
arise from the liberal tradition. As such, they both are likely to generate overall high 
levels of openness to trade and other economic activities. States that promote economic 
openness are likely to experience greater foreign intrusion and investment than those that 
legislate against it.33  
Another important consideration for governments is the level of welfare that they 
are to provide for their citizens. In states that possess societies that desire positive rights, 
governments are likely to fund programs that provide these. This is frequently referred to 
as the ‘welfare state,’ as the state provides many different services, ranging from 
healthcare and education to housing and unemployment and retraining programs for 
employees. The amount of welfare provided by the state can vary quite dramatically. 
States that favor more limited roles for government are likely to possess governments that 
are commonly referred to as ‘minimal states.’ This can be due to a variety of reasons, 
including but not limited to a desire for low taxes, a strong desire to protect negative 
freedoms and fear of government intrusion or a lack of the resources to provide a welfare 
state.  
                                                 
32 Emphasis in original. Also see Ferguson and Mansbach (2004) Rosenau (2003) for further explanation of 
how this process occurs.. 
33 An example of a country that primarily opposes foreign involvement in its domestic economic affairs, as 
well as more generally, is Zimbabwe. Evidence of this can be seen by President Mugabe’s ‘ownership’ 
laws that demand all businesses must be majority owned by nationals (BBC.com, 9 March 2008). 
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Domestic Welfare Table 1. Categories of 
Contemporary 
Economic Models. High Levels Low Levels 
High 
Levels Institutional Neoliberal Openness to 
Globalization Low 
Levels Socialist Clientist 
 
Therefore, government economic policies can fall into one of four categories. As 
depicted in Box 1, those in the first quadrant are globally open economies with a 
significant contribution towards welfare on the part of the state, characterizing an 
institutional approach; the second quadrant consists of globally open economies with 
minimal state welfare, which characterize neoliberal policies; the third quadrant contains 
globally closed economies with high levels of state welfare, which characterizes many 
clientist states and socialist states; and finally the fourth quadrant holds states that are 
closed and contribute little in the way of welfare to their citizens. 
The basic theory of this thesis is that the state is changing in its basic function due 
to globalization. The state’s primary function is to promote economic growth for their 
populations. This includes not only aggregate changes, but per capita changes. Owing to 
this shift away from identity as the primary role of the state, other aspects of the state 
impact economic growth as well. Government regime type and macroeconomic policy 
interact within the context of the level of globalization that a state has experienced. All 
three of these variables contribute to the augmentation or contraction of the economy. 
Each of these factors contribute individual on economic growth. The regime type 
that is in place impacts that legal structure of a society, creating differing apparati that 
enhance or restrict the action of a state’s members. Macroeconomic policies also directly 
impact economic growth by provide differing benefits to investment and domestic 
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concerns. How engaged a state is in globalization also provides differing economic 
results. The sharing of technology and perspectives towards the world contributes to 
economic growth in addition to purely economic restrictions. As ideas are shared and 
levels of engagement among populations increase, global norms are impacted. This does 
not mean that every state will have the same norms or that one state’s norms will 
dominate the rest; rather a mixture of ideas and norms will result, creating global 
concerns and procedures. Instead of resulting in a dialectic synthesis, all parties are 
impacted from globalizing influences and cannot return to the condition that they were in, 
at least socially and psychologically, after engagement. 
None of these factors occur in a vacuum, however. The interaction of regime type, 
macroeconomic policy and level of globalization impact domestic economic 
performance. 
The first hypothesis presented is that increased with interaction on a global scale, 
economic performance is increased. The spread of ideas, norms, goods and services 
across state borders promotes growth. This also can upset domestic power relations, 
particularly if new ideas and norms undermine traditional power structures. However, the 
negative effects of this on economic growth are offset by the knowledge gained and 
acquisition of new or higher quality goods. 
 
H1: ↑ Level of Globalization → Economic Growth 
 
 
Thus, the countering hypothesis would be 
 
 
H2: ↑ Level of Globalization has No Effect or Decreases Economic Growth 
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The third hypothesis posited here is that democratic regimes experience greater 
economic growth than authoritarian regimes. This is due to table laws which create a 
level playing field and clear rules of the game are integral to promoting a vibrant and 
dynamic market. Democracies greater number of institutions and veto players prevents 
the government from behaving in a predatory manner 
 
H3: ↑ Level of Democracy  → Economic Growth 
 
 
This leaves the counter to this hypothesis as 
 
 
H4: ↑ Level of Democracy Fails to Generate Economic Growth 
 
 
 The next series of hypotheses are related to macroeconomic policy. In particular, 
neoliberal policies limit economic growth, particularly in low-income countries. This is 
due to their inability to produce high-value added goods and lack of absolute advantages 
in trade in a competitive global market. On the other hand, institutionalist policies allow 
for some sectors to be protected while keeping the economy as a whole open. 
Institutional regimes will work within market confines to correct imbalances, through 
subsidies and services in kind. In addition, institutionalist policies counteract the minority 
segments of the population that lose in free trade through welfare, retraining and 
redistributive programs and maintaining social continuity. This is true not only of low-
income countries, but high income countries as well. High-income states often lose the 
two ‘traditional’ labor markets to low-income states due to higher labor costs, leading to 
higher real costs. As such, the lack of welfare and distribution of goods and services by 
the government hit these particular segments of the population especially hard. Neoliberal 
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policies open up the markets, resulting in an increase in consumer choice, but at the 
expense of often sizeable portions of the population. The instability caused by this 
democratic deficit provides turbulent rates of growth and can at times worry investors, 
resulting in capital flight. Socialist policies generate greater social equality, but at the 
expense of foreign investment, which is a significant source of technology and expertise 
(Jensen 2003; Li and Resnick 2003). As such, there is no exogenous force to help 
stimulate development. Lastly, Clientist policies reject foreign investment in much the 
same way as socialist ones. Additionally, the government plays a much smaller role in the 
economy. This results in less capital in the economy, making growth difficult. However, 
individuals are allowed to significantly control their own economic affairs, or, if they are 
apart the ruling regimes political party or coalition, they may benefit. Economies are 
likely to remain relatively small due to the limited size of economic actors.  
This leads to a series of hypotheses: 
 
H5: Institutionalist Policies → Economic Growth 
 
 
H6: Neoliberal Policies → Economic Growth 
 
 
H7: Socialist Policies → Economic Growth 
 
 
H8: Clientist Policies → Economic Growth 
 
 
Conversely, the alternative hypotheses to these are: 
 
H9: Institutionalist Policies Do Not Lead to Economic Growth 
 
 
H10:Neoliberal Policies Do Not Lead to Economic Growth 
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H11: Socialist Policies Do Not Lead to Economic Growth 
 
 
H12: Clientist Policies Do Not Lead to Economic Growth 
 
 Finally, there is the issue of interaction between the level of globalization, regime 
type and macroeconomic policy.  
 
H13: Interaction between the Level of Globalization + Regime Type + 
Macroeconomic Policies → Economic Growth 
 
H14: Interaction between the Level of Globalization + Regime Type + 
Macroeconomic Policies Does Not Impact Economic Growth  
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
The data is constructed according to a pooled time-series cross sectional (TSCS) 
data analysis.34 The independent variables are lagged by one year to prevent reverse 
causation. The following regression models of the research are analyzed based on a Prais-
Winsten ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with panel-corrected standard errors 
(PCSEs) for each country over the selected time period. PCSEs analysis is used in order 
to deal with the problem of heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous 
correlation in the error term in TSCS data sets.35 In order to account for the previous 
year’s growth, a moving average auto-regression order 1,2 model (ARMA(1,2)) is 
employed. The research tests the hypotheses presented here according to the one-tailed Z-
statistics since the hypothesis is directional. 90 countries are examined between the years 
1975-2003 in this study. They are selected according to data available from the KOF 
Globalization Index36 and the Polity IV project37 from the University of Maryland.38  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 This model is used by Li and Resnick (2003)  
35 Beck and Katz 1995 quoted in Li and Resnick (2003) and Jensen (2003)  
36 Dreher (2006). Updated in Dreher, Gaston and Martens (2008) 
37 The data was obtained in http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/index.asp 
38 This type of methodology, while lacking the precision of some other models, is valuable in that is 
provides a general analysis. Any conclusions or results drawn from such a model should be viewed with 
certain caution and is not intended to be indicative of a ‘one size fits all’ policy prescription. Rather, it 
intends to provide a general sense of overarching trends. A more comprehensive and insightful model could 
perhaps be employed at a later time under the direction and supervision of an advanced statistician, of 
which the present author is not.  
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CHAPTER 5. VARIABLES AND OPERATIONALIZATION 
5.1 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable used to test the hypotheses is economic growth. A change 
of the state from the primary identity to that of a secondary identity would change the 
function of the state. One function the state would continue to hold is that of an economic 
facilitator. Economic growth is operationalized as the growth rate of Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita. This is more telling than simply the growth rate of GDP, as it 
emphasizes only the aggregate and ignores population size. Examining only the growth 
rate of GDP also makes economies that are small appear to be stronger than larger ones, 
as an increase in a weak economy appears larger than an equal increase in a larger 
economy. By operationalizing economic growth as GDP per capita, the study hopes to 
find the impact of economic growth for each member of the society. Data of GDP per 
capita are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Index 2005. 
 
5.2 Independent Variables 
 A three part interaction variable will be employed to measure the impact of the 
level of globalization that a state has interacting with the global market, the level of 
democratization (or authoritarianism) that characterizes a state’s government, and finally 
whether a state takes an institutionalist or neoliberal approach. Using an interaction 
variable allows the research to examine the role that each variable plays in impacting 
economic growth. 
 The first independent variable is the level of globalization. Globalization is 
operationalized as a combination of the KOF index of globalization. This is a weighted 
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variable that measures the effect of economic, social and political globalization. As 
economic interdependency increases, it may increase the number of people that are 
engaged in global trade. These are taken from the economic indicators of the KOF 
globalization index. This index is made up of information that demonstrates actual flows 
data (trade as a percent of GDP, flows of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, 
stocks of foreign direct investment as a percent of GDP, portfolio investment as a percent 
of GDP and income payments to foreign nationals as a percent of GDP) and restriction 
data (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international trade as a percent of 
current revenue and capital account restrictions). The political globalization component 
(embassies in a country, membership in international organizations and participation in 
U.N. Security Council missions) and social globalization elements, such as personal 
contact data (outgoing telephone traffic, transfers as a percent of GDP, international 
tourism, foreign population as a percent of total population, and international letters per 
capita), informational flows data (internet users per 1000 people, cable television per 
1000 people, trade in newspapers as a percent of GDP, and radios per 1000 people) and 
cultural proximity data (the number of McDonald’s restaurants per capita, the number of 
Ikea per capital, and trade in books as a percent of GDP) demonstrate how much a state’s 
civil culture is interlinked into globalizing forces. It is expected that the more open a state 
is, economically, politically and socially, the greater the level of trade and economic 
growth that accompanies it. States that create barriers to foreign trade can expect less 
economic dynamism.  
 The second independent variable is the level of democratization, or type of 
government within the state. The level of democracy is operationalized on a scale of -10 
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being the most authoritarian to 10 being the most democratic. This data is obtained from 
the Polity IV project from the University of Maryland. The data was originally on a 21 
point scale (0-21), but is placed for convenience into the -10 to 10 point scale used here. 
The more democratic a state is, the more likely it is than its authoritarian counterpart to 
have a growing economy. 
Economic policy is the final independent variable. There are two types: neoliberal 
policies and institutionalist policies. In this research, a proxy variable is used to attempt 
to measure this. An index was created based on government consumption as a percent of 
GDP.39 This was obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Index 2005. 
Government consumption, while not an ideal indicator, captures the core idea of 
institutionalism, as it includes the gross spending on social services by a government. 
Redistributive, infrastructural and in kind welfare are likely to make up the greatest share 
of government consumption, even in states that experience high levels of corruption, 
simply owing to the volume that is required of them compared to that which can given to 
cronies. Based on the amount of government consumption, each state is assigned a value 
on an 11 point scale, with -5 being the least generous and 5 indicating the most welfare 
provided. It is expected that institutionalist democracies will generate the highest growth 
rates, as they provide both the infrastructure that many highly productive industries, 
particularly service industries, seek while at the same time provide the social safety net 
that employees often desire. In the tables displayed in the empirical data analysis section, 
this is listed as the ‘Level of Welfare.’ 
                                                 
39 Originally, total taxes was going to be included. Unfortunately, data access problems resulted in only the 
percent of taxes of industries, such as the service industry, being available for most countries. Total taxes 
were available for OECD countries. Government consumption is highly correlated with total taxes for those 
countries and for the service industry taxes as a percent of GDP for the total sample. Therefore, for 
simplicity, only government consumption was used. 
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In addition to each of these independent variables, an interaction variable 
consisting of all three will also be employed. While each independent variable may 
provide an impact of economic growth on their own, the impact may be confounded 
when they operate together. This appears to be the case after examining the real world, as 
most of the wealthy countries of the world provide some form of welfare to their citizens 
while existing as democratic states, as was earlier noted. In addition, these wealthy 
countries, largely centered in Europe and North America, though also existing in some 
other parts of the world, also tend to be highly globalized. 
 
5.3 Control Variables40 
Polity IV data is used to determine a durability variable.  Durability is important 
for investors, as past stability is an indicator of current and future government stability.  
MNCs are more likely to invest in countries with consistent policies and governments. 
Durability is expected to have a positive impact on economic growth. 
GDP per capita purchasing power parity is used to determine each country’s 
economic level. Developed countries tend to have higher economic levels than 
developing countries. Therefore, it is expected that developing countries are likely to 
experience higher rates of economic growth owing to their low starting point in absolute 
terms, making it possible to have larger relative growth rates compared to large, 
developed economies. Developed economies require a great deal of growth in order to 
                                                 
40 All of the control variables are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Index 2005 unless 
otherwise noted. 
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experience marginal growth due to the sheer size of their economies. Economic level is 
squared to account for Kuznets curve.41  
Natural resources tend to affect government type and economic policies. States 
based on natural resources tend to result in authoritarian regimes and groups within the 
state attempt to monopolize the resources and distribute them among their members. 
Likewise, states whose economies are highly reliant on natural resources also suffer from 
Dutch Disease, the economic phenomenon that causes all non-resources exports to drop 
in value as a response to the flood of capital inflows that is associated with specific 
mineral resources.42 Natural resources are measured as mineral depletion being equal to 
the unit resource rents and the quantity extracted.  This is the primary exports as a 
percentage of GDP.43 
Oil production is expected to have a similar impact to natural resources.  Oil is not 
included under the mineral standards of natural resources.  A dichotomous measurement 
is used for oil producers, with 1 being an oil producer and 0 producing little to no oil.  
Data is gathered from the Energy Information Administration (EIA).  Net exporters are 
those that exceed net exports of 1 million barrels per day.  Large producers are those 
countries that produce 2 million barrels per day.  Both are included as oil producing 
countries in the study. 
The next variable that will be controlled is ethno-linguistic diversity. A common 
charge against states that use institutionalist models, regardless of type of government, 
                                                 
41 Kuznet’s curve is the assumption that as countries develop income equality increases until it reaches a 
critical point at which it decreases. 
42 For more information about Dutch Disease and its effects, see Ebrahim-zadeh (2003) 
43 Data obtained from Sachs and Warner (1995) 
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are that they are fairly homogenous.44 To control for this, ethnic, language and religious 
data is used.45 
Economic inequality is controlled for and is operationalized as the Theil index.46 
While the Gini coefficient is also a commonly used variable in the literature, how it is 
computed over time has changed, making it a less than ideal measurement. On account of 
this, the Theil measurement is used in this analysis. It measures, based upon the income 
of each person within a subset, which in case is the state, the level of economic inequality 
within a subset. The larger T is, the greater the amount of economic inequality. Inequality 
is controlled for as dramatic and widespread inequality is likely to lead to unstable 
political conditions and limit growth.  
 Population is also controlled for, as larger population provide the potential for 
large markets. This makes them more likely to be targeted by firms and sought for trade 
and global engagement. Smaller populations are easier for governments to control and 
prevent from engaging in global trade in the modern age. 
 Lastly, the previous year’s GDP per capita is controlled for. This owes to the idea 
that the strongest predictor of future growth is examining the past. As such, if a country is 
growing economically, it is likely to perpetuate this trend by attracting growth and 
reinvesting previous growth. 
The model utilized here, with all variables, looks like the following: 
{Ŷt(j) = b1x1t(j) + b2x2t(j) . . . }t1 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 The Scandinavian states and the so-called ‘Asian Tigers’ come to mind. 
45 Wacziarg, Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly and Kurlat (2003) 
46 Data obtained from the Galbraith’s “Inequality Project” at the Lyndon B. Johnson school at the 
University of Texas. 
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The Moving Average (MA2) model looks like the following: 
 
Ŷt = B1Xt + B2Xt-1 = BXt 
 
 
Finally, the final model, with the auto-regression order 1 model looks like 
 
Ŷt = BXt + C1Yt-1 = DW 
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CHAPTER 6. EMPIRICAL DATA AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, the study will not turn to inspect the empirical evidence that was 
gathered during the 29 year period. The results of the sample of the time period as a 
whole are available in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Effects of Globalization, Regime Type and Macroeconomic Policy on Economic 
Growth, 1975-2003. 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Level of Globalization 0.07514*** 0.01559 
Level of Democracy 0.02684 0.02895 
Level of Welfare -0.23000*** 0.09665 
Interaction of Independent 
Variables -0.00001 0.00015 
Durability 0.00818* 0.00592 
Economic Level -0.06222 0.02485 
Natural Resources -0.12553 0.09973 
Oil -0.62076 0.49071 
Ethno-Linguistic-Religious 
Fractionalization -1.75481* 1.13856 
Economic Inequality 0.02027 0.06409 
Population 0.00134** 0.00078 
Previous GDP Growth 0.25253*** 0.07347 
N = 1050  R2 = 0.1387  rho = 0.08763 
Note: OLS Z-statistics and P-values in are based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with AR(1) correction 
*: Z .1 = 1.283.  **: Z .05 = 1.645   ***: Z .01 = 2.33. 
 
From this, the study finds that of the three independent variables examined in the 
study, the level of globalization that a state has undergone and the level of welfare that a 
state provides are significant. That is, states that experience increased levels of economic, 
social and political globalization experience greater levels of economic growth. From this 
analysis, it appears that macroeconomic policies do matter, however, they do not behave 
in the expected manner. For the sample as a whole, the evidence suggests that neoliberal 
policies are associated with enhanced growth rates. With each point shift in the ‘Level of 
Welfare’ index towards a more generous welfare state—institutionalist policies—there 
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appears to be a reduction in economic growth. The hypothesis that democracy promotes 
economic growth is also not supported. Likewise, the interaction of the independent 
variables appears to be insignificant. That is, looks as if there is no statistically significant 
relationship between the how engaged a state is globally, the type of regime that governs 
it and the type of macroeconomic policies that it employs.  
 Of the control variables, durability is found to produce positive economic growth, 
though it is significant only at the .1 level. Also significant at the .1 level is ethno-
linguistic-religious fractionalization. Increased levels of fractionalization seems to result 
in a highly negative way with economic growth. Large populations also seem to generate 
additional economic growth at a statistically significant level. Last and not surprisingly, 
the previous year’s GDP growth seems to provide a boost to economic growth, as history 
may be an indicator of future success. No other variables produced significant results.47  
After examining the results, some subgroups seem to behave in ways that run 
counter to results seen in Table 2. These will be looked at next. 
The study will now turn towards differences between developed and developing 
countries in terms of generating economic growth. Using the World Bank’s standards of 
high-income countries48, states with a Gross National Income of $11,116 or more, we 
find some differing results. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47 It is also worth noting that natural resources and oil both just missed the .1 threshold. 
48 In this study, a country need not have always been high income to be included in the high-income group, 
just that it currently meets the World Bank’s standards. In that way, states that have undertaken tremendous 
economic growth are included and their development strategy included with the actions of traditional 
members of the First World, for better or worse. 
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Table 3. Effects of Globalization, Regime Type and Macroeconomic Policy on Economic 
Growth on High-Income countries, 1975-2003. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Level of Globalization 0.10842*** 0.02286 
Level of Democracy 0.21379 0.17088 
Level of Welfare 0.09171 0.68900 
Interaction of Independent 
Variables -0.00028 0.00096 
Durability 0.00420 0.00560 
Economic Level -0.36815*** 0.07881 
Natural Resources 0.26880 0.37395 
Oil 0.69715* 0.43252 
Ethno-Linguistic-Religious 
Fractionalization -4.1872*** 0.95407 
Economic Inequality 0.15315 0.18787 
Population 0.01336*** 0.00479 
Previous GDP Growth 0.27775** 0.12204 
N = 411  R2 = 0.2917  rho = 0.17083 
Note: OLS Z-statistics and P-values in are based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with AR(1) correction 
*: Z .1 = 1.283.  **: Z .05 = 1.645   ***: Z .01 = 2.33. 
 
 
Looking at Table 3, the level of globalization remains statistically significant. The 
level of democracy also continues to have no impact on growth rates and, again, the 
interaction of the independent variables is insignificant, though it minimally missed the .1 
threshold. It is also important to note that in this model, the level of welfare provided by 
the government is no longer significant and contains large standard errors, indicating a 
high degree of variance.. 
As for the control variables, economic level, as would be expected, provides a 
negative relationship with economic growth. Somewhat surprisingly, oil appears to 
generate economic growth in wealthy countries at the .1 level. Ethon-Linguistic-religious 
fracturing again has a strongly negative relationship with economic growth and is highly  
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Table 4. Effects of Globalization, Regime Type and Macroeconomic Policy on Economic 
Growth on Low-Income countries, 1975-2003. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Level of Globalization 0.08538*** 0.02107 
Level of Democracy -0.00762 0.04175 
Level of Welfare -0.28679*** 0.08848 
Interaction of Independent 
Variables -0.00002 0.00029 
Durability 0.00978 0.01267 
Economic Level -0.07009*** 0.02311 
Natural Resources -0.09907 0.09365 
Oil -0.25898 0.64863 
Ethno-Linguistic-Religious 
Fractionalization -0.71802 1.25668 
Economic Inequality 0.02210 0.05851 
Population 0.00148** 0.00076 
Previous GDP Growth 0.24495*** 0.7668 
N = 639  R2 = 0.1396  rho = 0.02863 
Note: OLS Z-statistics and P-values in are based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with AR(1) correction 
*: Z .1 = 1.283.  **: Z .05 = 1.645   ***: Z .01 = 2.33. 
  
significant. Large populations again are positive and significant, as is the previous year’s 
rate of economic growth, though GDP is not as significant as in Table 2. 
All countries that did not meet the World Bank’s threshold for high-income 
countries were labeled as low-income. Table 4 contains their results. 
In this model, as in both of the previous ones, globalization continues to produce a 
significant, positive relationship with economic growth. Both the level of democracy and 
interaction variables was insignificant. The level of welfare holds a statistically 
significant, negative relationship with economic growth.  
Likewise, economic level also provides a significant and negative influence. The 
impact of population, while still positive and significant, is significant only at the .05 
level rather than the .01 as in the first model. The previous time period’s economic 
growth is positive and strongly significant. 
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These results, particularly the difference in the role of welfare between the high-
income and low-income states, seemed worth further inquiries. After several exploratory 
analyses of the data based on region, a review of the Asian countries apart from the other 
in the study seemed relevant.  
This was deemed relevant not only from these analyses, but also while the welfare 
indexes were being compiled. As was noted in the section about independent variables, 
using government consumption as a proxy for the level of social welfare as an indicator 
of institutional macroeconomic policies was not a perfect match. However, based on data 
availability and its correlation with taxes and redistribution programs, government 
consumption seemed as though it provided at least a general indicator of the basic idea. 
However, as Chang (2003a, 2003b) and Hall and Soskice (2001) note, many Asian states, 
particularly those of Southeast Asia, utilize institutionalist policies, providing a 
theoretical flaw in the methodology of attempting to quantify macroeconomic policy 
concepts. This is partly owing to the state rarely owning the banks that directly subsides 
industries—instead directing corporate production and bank loans and other financial 
actions through close, sometimes family, ties and legislation—is not reflected in this 
analysis. Indicative of this is that the average welfare rating for Asian states is -3.76, 
which does not appear to be reflective of reality and again reflects a flaw in the 
methodology and formula of the analysis due to data constraints.  
In an attempt to account for this, Asian states are excluded from the general 
model in Table 5 on the following page. 
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Table 5. Effects of Globalization, Regime Type and Macroeconomic Policy on Economic 
Growth, negating Asian countries, 1975-2003. 
 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Level of Globalization 0.07411*** 0.01618 
Level of Democracy 0.03581 0.03984 
Level of Welfare -0.03419 0.10587 
Interaction of Independent 
Variables -0.00019 0.00016 
Durability 0.01235** 0.00612 
Economic Level -0.07032*** 0.02930 
Natural Resources -0.05481 0.10251 
Oil -0.65037 0.52968 
Ethno-Linguistic-Religious 
Fractionalization -3.10002*** 1.15662 
Economic Inequality 0.04989 0.06621 
Population 0.00247** 0.00335 
Previous GDP Growth 0.18534** 0.08102 
N = 854  R2 = 0.1187  rho = 0.10650 
Note: OLS Z-statistics and P-values in are based on panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE) with AR(1) correction 
*: Z 0.1 = 1.283.  **: Z 0.05 = 1.645   ***: Z 0.01 = 2.33. 
 
 
 
Globalization is again positive and significant. Neither the level of democracy nor 
the interaction variable were significant. The level of welfare is not significant for this 
model, which combines high and low-income countries, excluding Asian countries. This 
is in stark contrast to Table 1 and Table 3. 
As for the control variables, durability was significant. As was true of the other 
models, the previous year’s GDP was a significant indicator of present growth. Economic 
level and ethno-linguistic-religious fractionalization were also significant. Population 
continued to be positive and significant. The analysis will now turn from the results to 
their impact on the hypotheses.  
Regarding H1, that the level of globalization generates an increase to economic 
growth, the study is unable to reject this, as each model generated found a statistically 
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significant increase on economic growth with each increase in the level of globalization. 
Thus, H2, its null hypothesis, is rejected. 
 The level of democracy was not statistically significant in any model. Owing to 
this, H3, an increase in the level of democracy leads to an increase in economic growth, 
must be rejected and its converse of H4 the study is unable to reject. 
 Macroeconomic policies produced mixed results. In Table 2 and Table 4, 
increases to the level of welfare seemed to reduce economic growth. However, for high-
income countries and in the model controlling for Asian states due to theoretical issues 
with the proxy variable, a relationship between macroeconomic policies and economic 
growth was not demonstrated at a statistically significant level. As a result to this, H5 and 
H7, hypotheses that predicted economic growth resulting from increases in the level of 
welfare, either due to institutional or socialist practices, must be rejected. However, the 
study also finds that limited welfare models of governance do not appear to generate 
economic growth in all contexts either. In Table 2 and Table 4, neoliberal policies of 
reduced welfare while operating with levels of globalization does generate economic 
growth. However, as was noted earlier, Tables 2 and 4 do not support this. Thusly, the 
study is unable to reject neoliberalism in all contexts. Nonetheless, it remains a somewhat 
unsettled debate, as its converse cannot be rejected in high-income countries or in a 
model consisting of all but Asian states. Regardless, H7 and H8, which concerns socialist 
and clientist states, can be rejected as the relationship between increased openness to 
globalization is statistically significant across all models. 
 Finally, no model found the interaction variable of the three independent variables 
significant. Therefore, H13 is rejected and the study is unable to reject H14. 
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CHAPTER 7. IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
The previous section contained an analysis of the empirical data related to the 
effects of the independent variables of globalization, regime type and macroeconomic 
policies on the dependent variable of economic growth. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
draw any clear results from the analysis and only general inferences can be drawn.  
From the analysis, it is clear that the level of globalization, economically, socially 
and politically, tends to generate positive impacts on economic growth. However, it is 
unclear what effect policy has on this.  
Looking at the original hypotheses, only H1—higher levels of globalization 
generate greater economic growth—can be supported with full confidence. Democracy 
seems to have no clear impact on generating economic growth, nor do macroeconomic 
policies appear to always matter. In already wealthy states, macroeconomic policies do 
not seem to play a significant role in economic growth. While trade openness is 
associated with increased globalization, it is unclear which causes the other, as Wolf 
points out (2005).  
Bloated state bureaucracies reduce economic growth. This may help explain why 
low-income states have a statistically significant negative relationship between the level 
of welfare and economic growth, as they are more likely than high-income states to be 
authoritarian or perhaps have less effective governance. Unfortunately, the 
operationalization used is not necessarily reflective of the intended measurement, as it is 
only a proxy due to data constraints. As such, the institutionalist models and bloated 
governments may be categorized together. Adding to the difficulty is that both neoliberal 
and institutionalist approaches are within the greater umbrella of liberalism. While the 
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data analysis demonstrates that lean, efficient governments generate more economic 
growth, it does not definitively demonstrate that institutionalist policies do not, or that 
they promote growth more slowly.  
In future research, a more comprehensive index could be compiled to more 
accurately reflect the differences of neoliberal policies in contrast with institutional 
policies. This could also indicate that macroeconomic policymaking does not have the 
impact on economic growth that many theorists and practitioners believe. If this is the 
case, perhaps normative considerations should play a larger role, particularly in wealthy 
countries.  
One possible implication of is that neoliberal policies are beneficial for 
developing as they essentially ‘cut the fat’ from inefficient states. As the state is exposed 
to social and political globalizing factors, it may experience challenges to the traditional 
power structure. However, this may remove inefficient processes, as well as practices that 
are viewed globally as unwarranted or undesirable.49 Once a state has achieved a certain 
point of wealth, it may be able to enact more institutional (and egalitarian) policies. 
As was demonstrated in the first three models, population seems to play a positive 
role in economic development. This may be owing to the logic that large populations are 
large markets, thus attracting capital. Smaller states with negligible populations may be 
ignored by global capital. This seems to suggest that the widespread fear of 
overpopulation in some states is not the driving force of economic stagnation or even 
depression. 
                                                 
49 This may include an expansion of human rights or gender and minority equality, as constructivist would 
argue that the increase in global civil culture, manifested in non-government organizations such as 
Amnesty International, Doctors Without Borders or Human Rights Watch, indicate changing norms. These 
norms would be spread through globalization in the as societies interact more with each other. 
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Perhaps more emphasis should be placed on geopolitical factors, which may 
provide an insight into why some areas seem to attract trade and eventual global openness 
while others do not. Geopolitical factors can create self perpetuating cycles of economic 
growth. Specific goods and services are more readily available at reduced costs in 
specific areas as opposed to others. This is true not only of area specific resources, but of 
specific industries that require overhead or especially skilled labor that is trained at a 
specific location. This may attract more capital, as the initial costs are already paid, 
resulting in continued development and further dynamism. In future research geopolitical 
factors will be addressed.  
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSION 
The primary result of this study is that globalization—the increase in participation 
and deepening of the spread of people, but more importantly goods and ideas—generates 
increased economic growth. This may result as norms and civil culture spread and 
become more readily available to a larger spectrum of the population. In addition, 
economic benefits are also spreading. The total impact of globalization is that it generates 
economic growth. As this study as demonstrated, democracy and increased levels of 
welfare do not generate economic growth. However, democracy does not, and under 
certain conditions, neither do welfare macroeconomic policies, prevent growth. As such, 
normative considerations should not be ignored under the guise of economic stagnation. 
Rather, states are free to select policies that fit their populations’ democratic sense of 
justice. 
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